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Article 5

SHAME AND IDENTITY
Pope's "Critique of Judgment" in
An Essay on Criticism
Blakey Vermeule

[Horace] labours to render us happy in relation to
ourselves...they who endeavour not to correct
themselves, according to so exact a model, are just
like the patients, who have open before them a
Book of Admirable receipts, for their Diseases, and
please themselves with reading it, without compre
hending the nature of the Remedies; or how to
apply them to their cure.
Andre Dacier, Preface to Horace (1691).

^ Passion and the
Two-Agent View
(^A^lexander Pope's direct and personal attack on the
literary critic John Dennis in the third section of An
Essay on Criticism (1711) is a glaring interruption of the
measured tone of the rest of his argument. The attack is
especially surprising given Pope's exuberant Longinianism
105
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elsewhere in the poem—an exuberance marred by the aggression
towards Dennis, the best-known of Longinus's English
followers, who had recently attempted a modernization or
"completion" of Longinusd Whereas "bold Longinus" is
An ardent Judge, who Zealous in his Trust,
With warmth gives Sentence, yet is always Just;
Whose own Example strengthens all his Laws,
And is himself that great Sublime he draws,^
Pope identifies Dennis not with his well-known commitment to
the neoclassical rules or with his views on poetic justice, but
with one of his failed theatrical characters:
But Appius reddens at each Word you speak.
And stares. Tremendous! with a threatening Eye,
Like some fierce Tyrant in Old Tapestry! (585-7).
The attack is perverse. Why should Dennis's Longinianism
sever his rhetorical excesses from his judgment rather than unite
them, as Longinus's own combination of these qualities does?
The passage stops short of attacking Longinian doctrine in
general, since in a few important respects it repeats the tenets
of that doctrine (at least as it was construed in the first few
decades after the late 17th-century European rediscovery and
translation of Longinus's Peri Hupsous). The first tenet is that
' In an important pair of essays, "The Advancement and Reformation of Modem
Poetry" (1701) and "The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry" (1704), Dennis attempted
to "complete" Longinus's account of the sublime by pointing to specific sources
in poetry (especially Milton). See Dennis, The Critical Works of John Dennis, ed.
Edward N. Hooker, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1939-43),
1:223.
^ An Essay on Criticism in The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope,
vol. 1, ed. E. Audra and Aubrey Williams (1961), 11. 675-80. Further references
will be cited in the text.
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an author's identification with his characters and his themes is
one of the sources of the sublime. Longinus's main example is
Homer identifying with the madness of Ajax: "These are truly
the feelings of an Ajax....Here indeed Homer breathes in the
inspiration of the fray."^ It is crucial to consider that Longinus
does not distinguish between Homer's identification with fully
autonomous agents and his identification with "the sublimity of
his heroic themes" or a "closely-packed profusion of the
passions.'"* Many different kinds of identification—with a
person, with a theme, or even with a bundle of passions— point
to Homer's "nobility of soul." There are reasons to think that
Longinus could elide the difference between persons, themes,
and passion-sequences in a way that Pope—writing at a very
different moment in the history of individuation—could not.^
And yet I take it that the principal reason that Longinus allows
themes, passion-sequences, and agents to count equally as
sources of authorial identification is that sublime effects include
a shock of surprise when poetic form turns into poetic content.
The matter of authorial identification is just irrelevant to the
formal processes by which authorial identification becomes
thematized: Longinus might as well say that Homer can show
his nobility of soul by turning his identification with a foot or
a tree into a source of the sublime. Put in these terms, there
are some affinities, which I will bring out more clearly later,
between the Longinian sublime and the genre of the satiric
anatomy.^
' Longinus, "On the Sublime," in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. T. S. Dorsch
(London, 1965), 112.
Longinus, "On the Sublime," 112, 113.
' For an intriguing political reading of Longinian notions of individuation, see
Jonathan Lamb, "Longinus, The Dialectic, and the Practice of Mastery" in ELH 60
(1993), 545-67. Lamb's argument partly turns on the difficulty of just anybody's
acting like Longinus; and against the spirit of the great eighteenth-century
translator William Smith's rather more fanatical attempt to christianize Longinus,
Lamb's account of sublime political agency is assimilated to certain episodes in
Longinus's own biography.
' In general the difficulty extending exemplarity where source and end of literary
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The second Longinian tenet on which Pope draws is closdy
related to the first one; it consists of the twin concepts of
exemplarity and self-reference. Elsewhere in the Essay on
Criticism, Pope explores related issues in the neoclassical poetics
of mimesis and poetic effects. Taken together (again in a
familiar neoclassical language), these separate principles
construct an aesthetic doctrine that a formally organized
imitation occasionally produces sublime effects that point
beyond the formal organization of the work:
At once the Source, and End, and Test of Art (73)
And snatch a Grace beyond the Reach of Art (155).
In the Dennis portrait, mimesis turns into exemplarity and
poetic effects turn into self-reference. Self-reference here (as
Pope explains it) consists of being subject to the same effect you
produce—that is, in being humiliated by being made to watch
your own bad play. And yet the very intensity of Dennis's
self-reference derails the second principle, the exemplarity that
Longinus advocated both as a rhetorical ideal and as a practical
effect. In Longinus's treatise, the sublime orator ideally
achieves an effect of exemplarity by experiencing transport as
a means of inducing it in nis audience. Yet Pope seems to want
to show that this process is absurd only in cases where the •
exemplary oscillation between source and end of poetic effects
takes place at a second remove from the source of the sublime.
effects are self-matching beyond the figure of Longinus himself showed that satire
was only a heartbeat away from the sublime. One nineteenth-century satirist
likened Longinianism to insanity: "Those who talk rationally on other subjects,
no sooner touch on this, than they go off in a literary delirium; fancy themselves,
like Longinus, 'the great sublime they draw,' and rave like methodists, of inward
lights, and enthusiastic emotions, which, if you cannot comprehend, you are set
down an un-illumined by the grace of criticism, and excluded from the elect of
taste." Quoted in Samuel Holt Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories
in Eighteenth-Century England (1935; rpt., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1960), 3.
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An obvious difference between Longinus and John Dennis is
that one is original, the other an imitator who embodies
someone else's theory. Pope's praise of Longinian self-reference
may simply not extend to other people behaving like Longinus.
And yet in another respect the attack on Dennis is a crucial
early, and as far as I can tell free-standing, revision of the
Longinian doctrine. Why does someone who looks as if he has
been struck by the Longinian effect best exemplify Longinian
criticism.^ And why. Pope seems to be asking, are staring and
reddening signs of transport.' These postures suggest either a
more violent or a more submissive attitude—an aggressive stance
or a humiliated one. Our knowledge that Pope intended his
portrait to shame Dennis by reminding him publicly of a
humiliating theatrical failure only complicates any sense of how
Dennis's affect works in these lines, since Pope is stealing some
of Dennis's Longinian fire for himself, creator of indexically
effective portraits. In this portrait we can discern something
like the following structure of effects. First, the well-known
Longinian transfer of emotion from one person to another
(which Neil Hertz has called the "sublime turn"^ allows Dennis
to identify with Longinus and to feel empowered by his
connection with the source of transport. Then in the normal
course of events, Dennis will become a new source of transport
by restarting the effects he has just witnessed. However, Pope
blocks this orderly transfer of emotion and stuffs the transport
Dennis is about to export to others back into himself, thus in
one stroke grotesquely completing the circuit of self-reference
and flattening transport into humiliation.
Pope's revision of the Longinian process in order to make
his treatment of Dennis into a source of his own power actually
looks surprisingly as though Pope had read Kant's "Analytic of
the Sublime" in the Critique of Judgment (1790) and decided to
'' Neil Hertz, The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 6.
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give a parodic account of the "fascination" or, to use a more
theatrical term, mesmerism of the sublime.® The sense in which
Pope looks as if he is parodying Kant can be brought out by
noticing that Pope's revision of Dennis parallels a psychoana
lytic argument about the role of reason in the Kantian
mathematical sublime. This argument, whose' two main
proponents have been Thomas Weiskel and Neil Hertz, is a
structuralist revision of the Kantian picture, explaining the
power-like conflicts (the characteristic "blockage" and "exalta
tion") of the sublime as having both linguistic and oedipal
motivations.' On the Kantian account, the imagination tries to
grasp an infinity of magnitude, yet fails to synthesize enough
particulars to complete the infinite series. Imagination's failure
leaves the way open for reason to intervene and save the
imagination in its identification with the sublime. Yet in saving
the imagination, reason also humiliates it, identifying more
closely than the imagination is able to with sources of sublime
power. I quote part of Kant's account of the imagination's
"delight in the sublime"—a delight whose limitation, negativity,
and ambivalence has proved a starting point for later readings
of the aesthetic power of mixed affectd°

' The term "fascination" belongs to Neil Hertz's extended discussion of the
charaaeristic sublime encounter. Hertz, 52.
' Wee Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and
Psychology of Transcendence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976 [rpt.
1986]), pp. 38-41, 99-100, and Hertz, 53.
We might think of Kant's account of the ambivalence of the imagination's
"delight in the sublime" as part of a larger eighteenth-cenmry concern with the
aesthetic paradox of the pleasures of pain. In its characteristic form, the
eighteenth-century aesthetic question of ambivalence focused on tragedy: Dryden,
Addison, Burke, and Hume all wrote solutions to the paradox that tragedy
produces pleasurable emotions through representations of painful events. Yet the
Kantian version of the problem in its own right has appealed to a range of critics.
For an account of the relationship between Kant's paradox and the eighteenthcentury ambivalence towards personihcation, see Steven Knapp, Personification and
the Sublime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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it is a feeling of imagination by its own act depriving
itself of its freedom by receiving a final determination in
accordance with a law other than that of its empirical
employment. In this way it gains an extension and a
power greater than that which it sacrifices. But the
ground of this is concealed from it, and in its place it feels
the sacrifice of deprivation, as well as its cause, to which
it is subjected."
In Weiskel's and Hertz's revision of this passage, reason's saving
humiliation of the imagination resembles the saving humiliation
of male oedipal identification—that is, a boy must "renounce the
aggression and turn himself into—be swallowed by—the image,
now an ideal, with which he is identifying."" In our parody
Pope, who insisted that he wrote the poem while still in his
teens, and who prominently sought the patronage of William
Wycherley and John Carryl, wilfully toggles a literary elder
between humiliation and transport."
The way that Pope mobilizes Dennis's passion to found his
own power is crucial to understanding the three respects in
which what I will call the satirical sublime approaches the
Kantian sublime, yet differs from it. As many critics have
noticed, the "Analytic of the Sublime" extends and critiques a
largely empiricist eighteenth-century aesthetic tradition that
begins with Locke, Shaftesbury, and Addison." Pope was
" Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. James Creed Meredith, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952), 120. For Weiskel's discussion of this passage, see The
Romantic Sublime, 39-41.
Weiskel, 93.
" The first volume of Pope's correspondence contains a complete record of such
self-authorizing strategies, of which his attack on Dennis seems a particularly stark
instance. See The Correspondence of Alexander Pope, ed. George Sherburn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 5 vols, 1956).
" To compare different approaches within the vast literature on this topic, see
Monk, op. cit., Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of Grace; Locke
and the Aesthetics of Romanticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1960), and Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic
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aware of such a tradition only in its early stages, if at all
consciously, through such empiricist writers as Addison and
Shaftesbury, who raise questions of poetic power for Kant as
well as for Pope. The three points of approach between the
Kantian and the satirical sublime are these: first, unlike the
Kantian sublime, the satirical sublime demands the poet's full
and immediate identification with the source of power rather
than the reason's embarrassingly late appropriation of it.
Second, power is conceived of in satire as a human contest for
dominance rather than as a contest sponsored by some
supersensible agent between personified human faculties. Third,
in the satiric portrait the relations between affect and agency are
externalized, so that the self-consciousness that will later
characterize the Kantian aesthetic is split up . between two
agents. In this respect Pope seems to be striking specifically
ancient—Longinian—aesthetic postures: Pope is Homer, Dennis
is either Ajax, a foot, a tree, or a bundle of affects—in short, an
object whose persona registers through its external attributes.
Dennis's status as object is confirmed in the following ways:
while he is being toggled about by his satiric master, he
entertains no awareness of ambivalence in his passions,
registering experience by embodying a single, and in Pope's
view, mistaken affect. His experience of his anger ("Appius
reddens at each word you speak") is divorced from its meaning
for him; instead, his experience is significant for others—for
Pope and for readers of the poem—as the feeling of shame.
At the end of this essay, I will mention a general theoretical
account, drawn from recent moral psychology, of shame as an
exceptional passion, motivating people even in the absence of
self-consciousness on the part of the person shamed. Shame is
exceptional because it is a passion driven primarily by
consciousness of others rather than by self-consciousness
(driven, that is, by external rather than internal forces). Yet
even without a fuller account of shame, we can notice that
(Cambridge; Basil Blackwell, 1990).
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Pope's deployment of it here turns Dennis into an image of
paradoxically embodied generality—embodied in himself, yet
meaningful for others. Here is finally the Longinian exemplarity that Pope denies Dennis on his own terms: exemplarity
consists of one person's emotion displayed for another person
as an effect of power or a status differential.'' As I will argue
in the next section, in devising his two-agent view of aesthetic
experience. Pope was more interested in intervening in
specifically modem neoclassical literary theoretical debates than
in offering his contemporaries the final revision or "completion"
of Longinus that Dennis had attempted.

The Two-Agent View
and Neoclassical Literary
Theory ^
In what sense does Pope's identification of literary power with
what looks like political power (a stunning revision of a literary
enemy) amount to more than either a formally conventional or
a methodologically insecure gambit for cultural authority.^ My
earlier Kantian formulation of the problem is meant to be
illustrative rather than explanatory, since neoclassical literary
theorists were uniquely preoccupied with determining a
" The question of whether such literary imitations of aggression produce the effects
of violence or minimize them has been a persistent one in writings about Longinus
and imitation in neoclassicism. Howard Weinbrot has recently argued that while
such aggression is central to Longinian literary theories, we should consider such
aestheticized versions of aggression as "emulation": "Unlike actual bloody war for
supremacy, neither head nor crown is lost in this miracle of benevolent combat.
Indeed, properly nurtured such competition reduces rather than increases
aggression." He also quotes Brossette from the Oeuvres de M. Boileau Despreaux
(Geneva, 1716): "dans ce genre (i.e. imitation) on pent etre vaincu sans honte." See
Britannia's Issue: The Rise of British Literature from Dryden to Ossian (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 100-110.
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methodology in which to ground a relationship between power
and aesthetic effects. Yet before turning to the historical
dimension of this question, it is worth noticing that a version
of it has been raised in recent skeptical neo-formalist critiques
of new historicist and post-structuralist attempts to determine
the political ideologies of the aesthetic on general grounds.'^
While sympathetic to the political motivations of recent antiformalist theory,'^ such neo-formalist skepticism tries to
determine the logical grounds for supposing that the literary,
the aesthetic, and the fictional (conceived of as actually existing
modes despite being under institutional construction at different
historical moments) can have either the positive or the negative
political consequences claimed by their defenders and
detractors.^'
What interests me here is that in the middle and later stages
of neoclassicism, the theoretical question of the relations
between the literary, conceived of as a formally ideal mode, and
political power was very much a live one. Characteristically
such a question flourished by displacing a more specific anxiety
about how poetry was supposed to secure its intended
effects—especially when those effects included feeling or passion.
The most typical stance of the French and English neoclassicist
was to imagine that an author is, in ideologically potent ways,
fruitfully subject to the same effect he produces. Such a stance
" For the neo-formalist reaction, see Steven Knapp, Literary Interest: The Limits
of Anti-Formalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) and Frances
Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation
(New York: Routledge, 1992).
" For an early eloquent and convincing argument against the various kinds of
formalism being practiced in eighteenth-century literary studies, see Laura Brown's
and Felicity Nussbaum's introductory essay to their volume The New Eighteenth
Century (New York: Methuen, 1987).
" Various accounts of the psychological effects of the fictional and of the literary
offer a more promising methodological story about the means by which fiction
come to be appropriated by ideological techniques of control. See Catherine
Gallagher's account of fiction in Nobody's Story: British Women Writers and the
Literary Marketplace, 1670-1820 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press), 1994.
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directly conflicts with a satiric tradition that has an author
controlling the effects generated by his poems—intending them,
and remaining emotionally uninvolved in their transmission.
The self-reflexive view of authorship is indebted to a wider
neoclassical investment in doctrines of imitation in which an
author mediates between his subject matter and his readers
(usually other authors), and becomes indistinct from both.
Dryden, drawing on some remarks by Scaliger on Vii^il,
celebrates Shakespeare in his preface to the Tempest as both
authorizing and authored by his material: "He Monarch-like
gave those his subjects law /And is that Nature which they
paint and draw."'®
In the later phases of neoclassicism, questions about reader
responses began to supersede the authority of imitative
doctrines as the largely aristocratic "je ne sais quoi" school of
taste sought to challenge legislative aesthetic judgments and to
subject imitative doctrines to an intense scrutiny.^" At stake in
this challenge is the role that regulative ideals (expressed in part
in the neoclassical "rules") ought to play in securing poetic
effects.^^ English critics in the early eighteenth century thought
poetry was supposed to work. So central was the notion of
" For an excellent treatment of neoclassical authorship in relation to aesthetic
doctrines of imitation, see Roger Savage, "Pope's Fable of 'Yoimg Maro' va. An
Essay on Criticism" in Alexander Pope: Essays for the Tercentenary. (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press, 1988).
The work of Dominique Bouhours on "Le Je ne sais Quoi" is especially
important in this regard. See Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugene (Paris, 1671).
Though this was never translated into English, his Ea Maniere de bien penser dans
les ouvrages d'esprit was translated as The Art of Criticism—Translated...lay a person
of quality (London 1705). For a stunning account of the role of the faculties of
taste and judgment in fashioning political arguments see Howard Caygill, The Art
of Judgment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 39ff. I am indebted to Caygill's
remarks on judgment in my own discussion of Pope's "critique of judgment," the
opening phases of the An Essay on Criticism.
For a still unsurpassed account of the role of the regulative in early eighteenthcentury aesthetics, see the section called "The Age of Criticism" in Ernst Cassirer,
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951
[rpt. 1979]), pp. 275 ff.

116

1650-1850

effectiveness to their conception of literary forms that a fullscale revolt against the neoclassical rules was delayed, perhaps
for decades, despite a growing feeling that the rules imposed a
heavy "yoke" on "the free spirits and forward geniuses of
mankind" and that they promoted "invidious distinctions of
bastardy and legitimacy" (to quote Shaftesbury).^^ The rules,
after all, were derived from Aristotle and Horace, authorities
both for a narrower though more prestigious kind of textual
criticism (the practice of a "krites"), and for the broader though
less prestigious kind of criticism that undertook, by giving an
account of the role of the passions in literary theory, to mediate
between literature and human nature (the practice of a
"theoros").^^ Utile et dulcis (teaching and pleasing) and
catharsis (the purgation of pity and fear within the formal limits
of tragic imitation) were famous directing ideals of the latter
sort. Yet when critics challenged the rules, openly by the 1710s
and 20s, they did so not because such promises seemed vacant
but because their prescriptions began to seem too indebted to
features of the ancient world. Despite defenses by Restoration
critics like Dennis of a "beautiful system of praecepts" that
spoke to fixed standards of human nature, to 1720s modernizers
like Leonard Welsted the rules were little more than someone's
distant authority made "mechanicall" through an overt and
unconvincing didacticism.^"* The stakes were consequently
raised in the hunt for a more supple method to explain the
^ Shaftesbury, Miscellaneous Reflections (1711), in Characteristics of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. John M. Robertson. (New York, 1964), 154.
The distinction between "krites" and "theoros" is an Aristotelian one, describing
two different modes of oratory. It loosely corresponds to the related etymological
distinction between criticism and theory. For a very suggestive account of the
difference between (sacrec^ commentary and (secular) criticism, and thus between
textual criticism and theory, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973), 78-81.
" John Dennis, "The Decay and Defects of Dramatick Poetry" (1725), is a long
defense of the rules against Leonard Welsted's Preface to the Epistles, Odes (London,
1724). The quotations from Welsted can be found on pages xix, xxxvii-xxxviii of
that preface. See Dennis, 11:285, 11:504.
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paradox of "Cette emotion naturelle qui s'exite en nous
machinalement" [that natural emotion that gets going in us
mechanically] and to reproduce it7^
Eventually English theorists abandoned the literary occasion
altogether in favor of a search for non-mechanical sources of
excitement; the critical tradition that had sought a rhetoric of
emotions finally "sublimated the emotional element of the
experience" and broke its ties to rhetoric when Addison
published his naturalizing "Pleasures of the Imagination" papers
in 17127^ Addison's principal innovation was to refuse a
substantial distinction between "a poem or a prospect" as the
source of the "Great, uncommon, or Beautiful" that sets the
mind in motion; the pleasures of the imagination precisely
consist in the mind's awareness of its own motions.
Before and up to this naturalizing turn, what picture of the
relationship between mechanical literature and non-mechanical
persons did neoclassicists have to have to believe that literature
was the source of actual effects on real people.' Like contempo
rary neo-formalists, some eighteenth-century writers were
generally skeptical of anti-regulative claims, decrying the ease
with which an idealist position could lapse into self-justification.
In 1709 for example, Mary Astell attacked Shaftesbury for his
idealizing stance in a Letter on Enthusiasm (1708). In that letter
he had joined a growing intellectual movement against a band
of French Huguenot refugees who came to London in 1706 to
B. DuBos, Reflexions Critiques sur La Poesie et sur La Peinture, Ut Pictura Poesis.
2 vols., (Paris 1719). 1:11.
Nothing could better indicate Addison's independence of the rhetorical tradition
than the fact that he sublimated the emotional element of the experience (Monk,
op. cit., 58). Monk also quotes Hildebrand Jacob, "How the mind is raised to the
sublime," as giving perhaps the starkest version of this psycho-aesthetic turn: "A
mind truly disposed for the perceptions of that, which is great and marvelous,
whether in nature or in art, is a product of nature and cannot be attained through
study. All the vast, and wonderful scenes...which the universe affords, have this
effect upon the imagination." The Works of Hildebrand Jacob (London 1735),
421-26. Qtd. Monk, 60, 60n.
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escape governmental persecution in the Cevennes.^^ Initially
welcomed by Anglicans and Dissenters, the "French Prophets"
were eventually reviled in part because they were the very
embodiments of the "erithusiasm" against which John Locke
and Henry More had polemicized for decades. Shaftesbury
thought that literary techniques that fostered laughter, wit, and
a rationalist Hobbesian glorying in the self's overcoming other
.people, were the best methods for defeating fanaticism—defined
partly as the practice of holding one's beliefs too blindly.
Astell objected that there are no grounds for supposing that the
"sublime of reason" can be struck through verbal effects:
That politick Indian, who thought to notch down all the
King of England's subjects upon his Stick, was a wiser
person by far than our great Pretenders to fine and true
wit, and sublime of reason. For there was some
proportion between his stick, and the English people;
whereas there neither is, nor can be any, between finite and
infinite}^ (my emphasis)
In one sense, Astell just means that all the wit in the world will
not alter the perspective of a person who does not already
subscribe to the "wits."
Other writers, like Pope, were more specifically skeptical
about de-regulating literary judgment precisely because such de
regulation would weaken the connections between texts and
their effects, or between authorial actions and authorial effects.^'
For a full account of the French Prophets see Hillel Schwartz, The French
Prophets: The History of a Millenarian Group in Eighteenth-Century England
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).
Mary Astell, Bart'lemy Eair: Or, an Enquiry after Wit; in which due Respect is
had to a Letter concerning Enthusiasm (London, 1709).
To underscore the differences between Pope and Shaftesbury on the necessity of
regulative ideals, compare their two very different responses to some lines from
Horace. In Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Ereedom of Wit and Humour, In a
Letter to a Eriend (London, 1709), Shaftesbury wrote:
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In order to secure a relationship between literature and persons,
Pope held out for the determination of literary judgment by
regulation (if not exactly by rules) rather than strictly by a
capacity for aesthetic feeling on the part of the judge.^° He
This lesson of philosophy, even a romance, a poem, or a play may teach
us; whilst the fabulous author leads us with such pleasure through the
labyrinth of the affections, and interests us, whether we wiU or no, in the
passions of his heroes and heroines:—
Angit,
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet,
Ut magus.
['Like a Mage, he tortures, enrages, soothes, fills us with false
terrors'], "
Shaftesbury calls this attitude "moral magic" which poets should not be at such
pains to deny, and he stresses its connections with the Je ne Sais Quoi school of
taste popular among a Ftancophilic aristocracy. Pope, though, who started the
shaming process in the first place has only this to say about the "falsis terroribus
implet." In one of the bitterest of his late Horatian imitations, the "Epistle to
Augustus," he rendered those lines as follows:
Yet lest you think I railly more than teach.
Or praise malignly Arts I cannot reach.
Let me for once presume t'instruct the times.
To know the Poet from the Man of Rhymes:
'Tis He, who gives my breast a thousand pains.
Can make me feel each Passion that he feigns,
Inrage, compose, with more than magic Art,
With Pity, and with Terror, tear my hear;
And snatch me, o'er the earth, or thro' the air.
To Thebes, to Athens, when he wdl, and where fTE IV, 225).
The full text of the lines from Horace's Epistle 11. 1 is as follows:
ac ne forte putes me, quae facere ipse recusem,
cum rette tractent alii laudere maligne:
iUe per extentum funem mihi posse videtur
ire poeta, meum qui pectus inaniter angit,
inritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet,
ut magus, et modo me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis.
In Book 4 of the Dunciad (1743), Pope mocks Shaftesburian aestheticism directly:
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characterized literary judgment as an exercise of faculties largely
independent of the beauty of literary objects or of their
• tendency to provoke sympathetic identification. In doing so, he
cut himself off from the mainstream of eighteenth-century
literary theoretical development: later readers have seen An
Essay on Criticism as the final stop on the sixteenth and
seventeenth century Horatian line—a line that included Vida,
Boileau, the Earl of Mulgrave, and the Earl of Roscommon.'^
Yet by saving the intersubjective character of literary criticism
(the extent to which criticism depends on the mutual awareness
of someone judging and someone judged), Pope actually
performs a heroic gesture for an author. He prevents his
twinned "critic" from cutting loose from him altogether, and
from withdrawing consequently into a Longinian frenzy of selfreference.^^

Or that bright Image to our fancy draw,
Which Theocles in raptur'd vision saw,
While thro' Poetic scenes the Genius roves.
Or wanders wild in Academic Groves (487-490).
Theocles refers to a character in Shaftesbury's Moralists (1711).
" See the introduction to An Essay on Criticism by Walter Jackson Bate in his
volume Criticism: The Major Texts (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952).
Pope's relations with Dennis capture a persistent issue in literary criti
cism—namely the extent to which criticism is "parasitic" on texts. In Northrop
Frye's "Polemical Introduction" to his Anatomy of Criticism he defends "the right
of criticism to exist at all" by analogy to the new critical defense of poetry as
"poetry and not another thing," as M. H. Abrams wrote in 1957, the same year
that Frye published his study of poetic types. Frye is arguing against what he calls
"determinism"—the notion that what is interesting to criticism is a set of pre
arranged frameworks given by philosophy or by history: "criticism is a structure
of thought and knowledge existing in its own right, with some measure of
independence from the art it deals with." An Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), 5. See also M. H. Abrams, "Belief and the
Suspension of Disbelief" reprinted in Doing Things with Texts: Essays in Criticism
and Critical Theory (W. W. Norton, 1991), 89.
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Shame and Criticism
why is a two-agent view of literary judgment a solution to the
competing claims of taste and rules? Why does Pope think that
the intersubjectivity of literary judgment entails the Longinian
concept of exemplarity? And why does Pope propose a
psychological solution (shame) to methodological problems raised
by the dirninishment of clear lines of patriarchal or imitative
authority? In the rest of this essay, I will argue that Longinian
exemplarity stands at the heart of Pope's account of literary
judgment, and implicitly of criticism, because of the way it
unites affect and regulation in a model both more systematic
than Shaftesbury's taste-driven account and more supple than
the constraining rules. But before turning to the role of
judgment in An Essay on Criticism, it is worth noticing that
elsewhere in his satire of the period Pope stressed the connec
tions between Longinian exemplarity and literary criticism."
" Pope may have picked up on certain peculiarities in the Longinian plan for
getting people to take themselves as their own examples on account of the
frequency with which the Longinian trick was turned against him. An anonymous
anti-Pope pamphlet called "His Holiness and his Prime Minister, the phiz and
Chararter of an Alexandrine Hypercritick and Commentator" rebuked Pope by
quoting his own portrait of the shame-causing satirist Thersites in Iliad XII in
terms that stress the fit, not only between author and character, but between figure
and meaning:
His figure such as might his soul proclaim;
One eye was blinking, and one leg was lame.
Aw'd by no shame, by no Respect controul'd.
In Scandal busy, in Reproaches bold—
Spleen to mankind his envious heart possest.
And much he hated all, but most the best.
Dorothy George, Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires Preserved in the
Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum (London, 1870-1954), vol.
2, 676. The representation of Pope as Thersites the satirist was quite common; see
for example, the Daily Journal, March 29, 1728. Pope also seems to have been
struck by this comparison as part of his self-description: he veered ambivalently
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In The Critical Specimen (1711) he gave a portrait of Rinaldo
Furioso, Critick of the Woeful Countenance, who mistook his
Hobby-horse for Pegasus:
He fancy'd that he was now mounted on Pegasus, and
that he had travelled several Leagues through the Air
towards Mount Parnassus; during his Imaginary Flight, he
was heard to repeat with great vehemence the following
Rhapsody:
Fly Pegasaean Steed, thy Rider bear.
To breathe the sweets of pure Parnassian Air,
Aloft I'm swiftly born, methinks I rise.
And with my Head Sublime can reach the sky.
The second attack came in a piece of early Scriblerian satire
with explicitly Swiftian overtones. The Narrative of Doctor
Robert Morris; Concerning the Strange and Deplorable Frenzy of
Mr. John Denn[is] an Officer of the Customhouse (1713) is a story
about a Doctor Norris called to the home of an old critic who
has started a lunatick ranting upon reading some lines of Pope's:
Mr. John Dennis...finding on...Mr. Lintot's counter a
book called An Essay on Criticism...read a page or two
with much frowning, till coming to these two lines.
Some have at first for wits, then poets past,
Turn'd critics next, and prov'd plain fools at last,
he flung down the book in a terrible fury, and cried, by
G—d he means me.
between thinking of Thersites as a king-bashing satirist-hero—much as 1. F, Stone
has done in a fascinating defense of Thersites as a proletarian hero in his Trial of
Socrates—and comparing him to merit-bashing Dullness. Indeed, Thersites's name
comes from the greek thrasos = busy, bold, familiar epithets for the Goddess
Dullness.
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Norris finds the slovenly Dennis wallowing in his own
exfoliated skin and dirt. Drawing on the period's familiar
humeral language of madness/'* Pope describes the nature of
Dennis's disease:
His eye-brows were grey, long, and grown together,
which he knit with indignation when any thing was
spoken, insomuch as he seemed not to have smoothed his
Forehead for many years.
He often opened his mouth, as if he would have uttered
some Matter of importance, but the sound seemed lost
inwardly.
On all sides of his Room were pinned a great many
Sheets of a Tragedy called Cato, with Notes on the
margin with his own Hand.
The Words Absurd,
Monstrous, Execrable were written in such lai^e
Characters, that I could read them without my spectacles.
The climax of the scene is a confrontation between Dennis and
Doctor Norris, who finally understands that the cause of
Dennis's peculiar behavior is a "criticism"—both a state of mind
and a swelling in his leg:
Dennis: Behold Doctor, it was thus Aristotle himself and
all the great antients spent their Days and Nights, wrapt
up in Criticism, and beset all around with their own
Writings....
Doctor: Pray Sir how did you contract this Swelling.'
Dennis: By a Criticism.
Doctor: A Criticism! that's a Distemper I never read of
in Galen.
See Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the
Restoration to the Regency (London: Athlone Press, 1987).
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Dennis: It is no Distemper but Noble art. I have sat
fourteen Hours a day at it; and are you a Doctor, and
don't know there's a communication between the legs
and the brain.^
The structure of the satiric anatomy comes close to being the
same as that of an exemplary allegorical figure.
Dennis
combines features that can only follow from his self-absorption
with features that can only match his objective practice. And
yet the satiric portrait fails to conform in a few key ways to the
structure of an allegorical figure. The question about the figure
of Dennis, as opposed to the figure of Bernard Lintot the
London Bookseller, whose behavior straightforwardly conforms
to the actions of a greedy and powerful eighteenth-century
bookseller, is what is the connection between the "criticism," or
the thing that motivates the self-absorption, and the selfabsorption itself? The answer is partly suggested by Pope's
humeral language (Dennis just is a type controlled by an
abstraction), but the humeral theory has less than a total
explanatory force, since the humor produces only one of the
allegorical features of the portrait (a swelling in the leg). The
rest of the allegorical tableau has to be filled in by including the
self-absorbed figure in a whole room full of absorbing things,
thus denaturalizing the image sufficiently to render it emblem
atic. And yet even here where we expect allegory to triumph,
its traditional indices fail: if criticism is the cause of his selfabsorption, why doesn't Dennis sustain himself on it more
directly by lingering over the criticism he has pasted up on his
walls? And if he should just be taken as a figure for selfabsorption in general, why are the lines from the Essay on
Criticism initially required to jump-start the whole process?
Self-absorption in short is not self-starting, but it is selfsustaining. Since Pope's lines about critics and fools were aimed
at Dennis, the period's type of an author/critic, Dennis is not
incorrect in Pope's account of his assumptions that Pope meant
to refer to him personally as an emblem. Yet Pope's joke ("by
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God he means me") captures some of the strangeness of the
Longinian confusion between actual persons and didactic
examples when someone sees himself reflected in a vague
allusion to poets and critics, a strangeness that implies that
impersonal judgments ought to (or can) be taken personally. I
will now consider in more detail why Pope thinks that
judgment is something to take personally, and why it involves
this kind of allegorical self-reference. (At this point it is unclear
what is meant by judgment: a faculty? the practice of a critic?
reason as opposed to wit or fancy? I hope my remarks on An
Essay on Criticism will make clear that Pope is playing with all
three senses, current in the literary/philosophical thought of
post-Lockean literary culture.^^)
Of all the essays on criticism written in a Horatian mode
(including practical, homey advice about how to make your
writing conform to the literary dictates of the day). Pope's most
directly stages a contest between writing and criticism. In the
opening lines Pope sets himself up as the judge of a contest
whose prize is the title "greater Want of Skill" (1). Criticism
does not win this title outright, though, as one might expect.
Criticism is more "dangerous" because it misleads our sense
with bad judgments rather than merely tiring our patience the
way bad writing does, and hence would seem to require more
skill. But criticism is so limited to repeating someone else's
action that by contrast writing seems incredibly unconstrained:
"A Fool might once himself alone expose / Now one in verse
makes many more in prose" (7-8). The writer loses the
competition in the end by unwittingly leading trained
mimeticists to expose their vanity for the sake of that writer's
reputation and glory by imitation rather than independence.
Locke's famous distinction between wit and judgment discerned the difference
between a linguistic play of signs and a faculty that was supposed to unite
particulars. The way a faculty can tmite particulars in empiricist philosophy is a
problematic issue, and not one I will pursue here except in an oblique way towards
the end of this essay.
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And yet criticism's triumph here hardly amounts to an
indictment, since the province of these mimetic lemmings is so
far only cavilling and philology ("Ten Censure wrong for one
who writes amiss"). That is, the opening of the Essay addresses
textual competitiveness as mimetic constraint rather than
literary judgment as specio (looking or beholding—the Latin
translation of the Greek theorid) or contemplation.^^ Yet almost
immediately. Pope acknowledges criticism's expanded theoreti
cal claims. He turns his interest from the products on which
judgment exercises itself to the sources of judgment. There are
three sources of judgment; "heav'n" (13), personal beliefs (10),
and "seeds" in the "Mind" (20). Initially it looks as though
Pope ought to discount the latter two of these sources, since
both personal beliefs and seeds in the mind are inerely personal
warrants for judgment, and thus close to the scandalous selfabsorption of a Dennis figure.
And yet surprisingly both
heaven and personal beliefs lose out to seeds in the mind as the
authoritative source for true judgments:
'Tis with our Judgments as our Watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own.
In Poets as true Genius is but rare.
True Taste as seldom is the Critick's Share;
Both must alike from Heav'n derive their Light,
These born to Judge, as well as those to Write (9-14)
Authors are partial to their Wit, 'tis true.
But are not Criticks to their Judgment too.^
Yet if we look more closely, we shall find
Most have the Seeds of Judgment in their Mind;
Nature affords at least a glimm'ring Light;
For a brief account of these terms in the Greek tradition, as well as a longer
account of the role they play in modern theories of interpretation, see Martin Jay,
"The Rise of Hermeneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism," Force Fields:
Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York: Routledge, 1992),
106.
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The Lines, tho' touch'd but faintly, are drawn right (17-22).
One way of explaining why Pope prefers human faculties to
both the most authoritative-looking source for critical judg
ments (heaven) and the least authoritative source (taste), is that
a conflation of the two particularly marks out self-interest.
People believe certain things on the basis of their inferences
about universal designs (the argument from design says that just
as the existence of a watch allows us to infer a watchmaker, the
orderliness of the universe allows us to infer a maker), but
make the mistake of believing that the designs of heaven are as
casually personal as a watch, and thus that their interests can
coincide with heaven's interests. The resulting "partiality" (17)
to one's own side or point of view is both more politicallooking and less justified than the quasi-deist condition of doubt
afforded by nature's "glimm'ring light" and faint touch of the
correctly drawn line (21-22). Holding these doubtful judgments
allows people to put together "finite and infinite" in a seamless
analogy between internal and external concord:
Nature to all things fix'd the limits fit,
And wisely curb'd proud Man's pretending Wit:
As on the Land while here the Ocean gains.
In other parts it leaves wide sandy Plains;
Thus in the soul while memory prevails,
The solid pow'r of Understanding fails;
Where Beams of warm Imagination play
The memory's soft figures melt away. (52-59)
This opening reversal, where puny-looking faculties trump
heaven as the source of authoritative judgments, is Pope's way
of discrediting his predecessor and immediate English rival in
the genre of practical poetic essays, John Sheffield, Duke of
Buckinghamshire, Earl of Mulgrave. In Mulgrave's opening
lines (lines that read like a compressed and optimistic version of
Pope's) the aristocratic coincidence of persons with providence
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is as overwhelming and oppressive as the ancien-regime sun that
symbolizes it;
Of things in which Mankind does most excell
Nature's chief Master-piece is writing well;
And of all sorts of Writing none there are
That can the least with Poetry compare;
No kind of work requires so nice a touch,
And if well done, there's nothing shines so much;
But Heav'n forbid we should be so prophane.
To grace the vulgar with that sacred name;
'Tis not a Flash of Fancy which sometimes
Dazling our Minds, sets off the slightest Rimes,
Bright as a blaze, but in a moment done;
True Wit is everlasting, like the Sun,
Which though sometimes beneath a cloud retir'd.
Breaks out again, and is by all admir'd.
{An Essay Upon Poetry 1682)^^
The "vulgar" might be foi^iven for momentarily letting their
attention wander from admiring the feudal dominance of "true
wit" to contemplating their own "slightest Rimes," however
fleeting, since their incompatibility with a providential order
has already disqualified them from writing well. In revising
Mulgrave's opening. Pope breaks open the settled hierarchy of
providence and good writing that is also—scandalously—an
identity, by triangulating writing and the workings of
providence with a third term: judgment.
Pope's redefinition of the term "judgment" from a tool of
providence to a trifling and doubtful human faculty also draws
on a specifically Lockean redefinition of the term along similar
lines. In Locke's view, judgment was misappropriated not by
aristocrats like Mulgrave but by the prophets of a visionary
certainty during the religious wars of the seventeenth century.
Spingarn 11: 286.
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Yet Pope is clearly playing with the two senses of judgment.
As his watch simile makes clear, some subscription of judgment
to personal belief or prejudice may be inevitable; and the
combination of that subscription with heavenly authority leads
to the following complication. Heaven gives critical judgments
to humans, and yet also gives providential ones, as it were,
despite humans. On what grounds can one distinguish between
them? Having that knowledge seems especially important
because one of the key aspects of judgment's status as a faculty
is that it involves the capacity to make distinctions—between
objects, between people, and especially, in the empiricist
tradition, between sources of pleasure and pain. For John
Locke, judgment performs this crucial function so well that we
just have to assume (out of a paradoxically skeptical trust) that
our personal judgments line up with providential ones. Such an
assumption relieves us of the necessity of determining whether
our judgments do in fact coincide with providence:
For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of
being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge
of things free from all doubt and scruple, but to the
preservation of us in whom they are, and accommodated
to the use of life: they serve to our purpose well enough
if they will but give us certain notice of those things
which are convenient or inconvenient to us.^'
In the Lockean account, judgment is our first line of defense, a
self-preserving tactic with which we discern and reject possible
sources of harm. Relying on our own faculties saves us from
having first to discover how providence works and then to read
its will correctly in order to defend ourselves. Such a task
would be endless because our puny faculties are not capable of
ascertaining such information on their own (and we would
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 652-53.
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almost certainly be harmed by the source of harm in the
meantime).
What must the structure of judgment be like that it can so
easily involve providence either as a source of certainty or as a
source of doubt.' In Pope's poem, two models of judgment
emerge, one leading to certainty, the other to doubt. In fact
they are so alike that they can be counted as versions of the
same model, and the basis for deciding between them simply
turns out to be a personal preference for being in the condition
of certainty or skepticism. And both models depend, crucially,
on a self-referential turn.
The suspension or indeterminacy that I earlier sketched in
the opening lines of the Essay between judgment as a personal
and as a universal category finally ends at line 45. There Pope
lays out his own views on the nature of proper judgment:
But you who seek to give and merit Fame,
And justly bear a Critick's noble Name,
Be sure your self and your own Reach to know.
How far your Genius, Taste, and Learning go;
Launch not beyond your Depth, but be discreet.
And mark that point where Sense and Dullness,meet (46-51).
Many critics have noticed that An Essay on Criticism is a howto manual, but they have assumed that Pope veered indecisively
between thinking he was telling people how to write poetry
and telling them how to read poetry. This confusion has been
traced to the primitive theoretical concerns both of an Horatian
orientation and of eighteenth-century literary theory in general,
a primitivism that leads to a vertiginous confusion between
two of the four major "orientations" or a work of art—genetic
and affective ones, or the sources and ends of art.^' Less
" See William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks. Literary Criticism: A Short History,
2 vols., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957; Midway Reprint, 1983), vol.
1, entries on Pope, neoclassicism, and Horace. Ripley Hotch has argued that Pope
was interested less in theoretical questions than in announcing himself as a poet.
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noticed, I believe, is that Pope's advice consists of how to get
the faculties to harmonize in a particular way. The method
here seems to involve peeling judgments off beliefs, or at least
accepting that the coincidence between judgment and belief does
not amount to a justification of either. Thus Pope contests
critical judgments that resemble political ones:
Some valuing of their own Side, or Mind,
Still make themselves the measure of Mankind;
Fondly we think we honour Merit then.
When we but praise our selves in other men.
Parties in Wit attend on those of State,
And publick Faction doubles private Hate (452-7).
Yet what is the difference between making one's self "the
measure of Mankind" and knowing one's own reach? The only
difference seems to be that in the case of self-interest, one turn
first to one's self in order to secure one's judgments; and in the
case of healthy critical practice, one secures one's judgments
because one has referred first of all to one's self. That is, the
difference between self-interest and self-reference is a slight but
important one, since the first leads to political faction and the
second to a kind of healthy, self-distanced critical practice.
How are critical judgments possible given that they require
restriction and curtailment to avoid seeming like judgments
made in the heat of sectarian violence?
At the end of the poem. Pope offers a brief portrait of
"Walsh"—"the Muse's Judge and Friend, / Who justly knew to
blame or to commend" (729-30). Now that Walsh is dead, the
muse has lost her "Guide," and therefore rests content that
"[t]he Learn'd reflect on what before they knew... / Still pleas'd
to praise, yet not afraid to blame" (740-742). Healthy critical
though in my view, the two questions—theory and authority—are linked. See
Hotch, "Pope Surveys His Kingdom: An Essay on Criticism," in SEE: Studies in
English Literature, 1500-1900 13 (1973), 474-87.
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judgments include compensation in the form of heightened
affect for the restriction entailed by having to see someone else's
view. This compensation means that in a slightly artificial way
a critic gets to take a thematic interest in her own condition
(reflecting on what before she knew seems like a version of
inspecting the contents of her own consciousness), while being
bound to some particular literary occasion or to a particular
author.
There is risk associated with this kind of agency, however,
namely the risk of slipping into a self-condemnation as violent
as that of Atossa in Pope's Epistle to A Lady (1735). Atossa is
Pope's type of extreme and murderous inconsistency who is
Scarce once herself, by turns all womankind!
Who, with herself, or others, from her birth
Shines, in exposing Knaves, and painting Fools,
Yet is, whate'er she hates and ridicules (116-20).
The risk of slipping into an Atossan pathology parallels the risk
of making critical judgments, since the margin between selfjudgment and self-reference is so slight. It is easy to imagine
someone gaining enough distance from herself to include herself
in her own judgment, but difficult to think of someone gaining
enough distance from the world and not from herself to avoid
including herself in her own judgment. Atossa's pathology thus
veers vertiginously close to the structure of criticism on the
Longinian picture—a picture that as I have repeatedly suggested
oscillates between generality and particularity.
An additional way that Atossa comments negatively on the
kind of self-reference Pope constructs'm An Essay on Criticism
can be brought out by noticing that in the Epistle to A Lady,
Pope is subject to the Atossa-effect he describes. Atossa's
oscillation between the general and the particular is related to
Pope's interest in her gender. Atossa's generality is false: how
can someone be "all womankind" without ever being one
particular woman—"herself".^ And yet Atossa exists to the
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extent that she is the object of her own emotions ("Yet is,
whate'er she hates and ridicules"), existing, that is, wherever she
can "catch herself" as the object of her own emotions (to
paraphrase Hume's formulation of personal identity). Since
Atossa's relationship to herself parallels Pope's relationships to
"most women" (1.2), where satiric forms are the condition of
her existing at all, her gender ought to be taken as a figuring the
perversion of Pope's own authorship. Thus Atossa is like Pope
himself, who rapidly collapses into an Atossan pathology,
becoming indistinct from "whate'er he hates and ridicules.'"'"
Why then does the Dennis portrait function as a positive
argument for an author-or agent-dependent critical practice?
Shame counts as an emotion of moral motivation, as Gabriele
Taylor and other moral psychologists have shown, when the
person for whom shame is a regulating ideal or moral emotion
takes herself as her own example from the perspective of others.
Feeling shame is connected both to self-consciousness and to an
audience; "[t]he person feeling shame feels exposed: he thinks
of himself as being seen through the eyes of another.'"" Yet,
Taylor goes on, feeling shame does not require an actual
audience, only the possibility of imagining what an audience
would be like:
It is certainly true that to feel shame about his inferior
work and craftsman need not think, ie., either believe or
For a fascinating account of the way author/spectator relationships work in these
lines, see Patricia Meyer Spacks, "Fictions of Passion: The Case of Pope" in Studies
in Eighteenth-Century Culture 20 (1990). Spacks argues that the ruling passion may
not be psychologically convincing, but it is convincing as a doctrine of fiction in
part because "[t]he victim of a ruling passion suffers that passion as a disease; only
the spectator can employ it as a rationalizing structure" (50). Part of the problem
with Atossa is that as Spacks points out, her ruling passion is never explicitly
identified and thus in powerful ways cannot count as a rationalizing structure for
judgment. This account helps to explain why Pope has difficulty rationalizing his
own difference from the Atossan pathology,
*" Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: • Emotions of Self Assessment (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985), 57.
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imagine that there is another craftsman looking at his
work. He need not imagine an actual observer, and that
there is such an observer need not be part of the content
of his thought. All that seems necessaiy is that he shift
his viewpoint from that of the creator of the work to that
of the critical assessor, and he himself can fulfill both
those functions."*^
Bernard Williams has recently corrected Taylor's view that
shame feels the same if there is an external agent or if the
shamed person only feels as though there is an external agent.
On Williams's view, shame is an emotion connected both to
self-consciousness and to the experience of a watcher. Shame is
positively heteronomous: it does not have to connect to
internal motivations in order to be morally effective, in the way
that Kantian moral philosophers argue that guilt or a sense of
"Achtung" ought to function as a moral motivator. Williams
stresses the point that between the two agents—the other and
the self—there is usually a status differential, which is why
shame functions especially well as a morally regulative emotion
within the social.''^
On the view I. have been trying to develop, well-regulated
critical judgments depend on just such a heteronomous, socially
regulating force. This is finally Pope's point about literary
critical practice: it depends on the externalization of the
process of self-reflection as a kind of mechanical figuration. The
proximity of Atossa's pathology to the structure of criticism
and the proximity of the latter but not the former to accounts
of the role of self-consciousness in experience of regulating
shame shows how delicately balanced this whole structure of
externalized self-reference must be in order to avoid falling into
a series of negative psychological extremes. The first of these
Taylor, 58.
Bernard William, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1993), 89, 220.
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extremes is of course Atossa, whose self-judgments collapse into
self-condemnation.
The other extreme is represented in Pope's portrait of
Addison in the Epistle to Arbuthnot {173A). Pope's wrote his
portrait of Addison as Atticus only a few years after An Essay
on Criticism, though he never published it, preferring to keep
it in reserve in case his rocky relationship with Addison went
out of control.'*'^ The verbal echoes between Addison/Atticus
and the type of good critic (post-Walsh) drawn at the end oi An
Essay on Criticism are stunning—so stunning that Pope probably
wrote the Atticus portrait in order to show what a type of bad
literary critic would be. Again, Addison faces the risk of
criticism as formalized self-reference and refuses it. Instead he
continually perverts the regulating structure of literary
judgment into endless occasions for slightly sterile selfcongratulation. It is precisely by refusing to extend himself
into judgment that he imagines he can prevent any judgment
from being made about him. His strategy is to
Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer.
And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer;
Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike.
Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike;
Alike reserv'd to blame, or to commend,
A tim'rous foe, and a suspicious friend.
Dreading ev'n fools, by Flatterers besieg'd.
And so obliging that he ne'er oblig'd;
Like Cato, give his little Senate laws.
And sits attentive to his own applause;
While Wits and Templars ev'ry sentence raise.
And wonder with a foolish face of praise.
What Pity, Heav'n! if such a Man there be.
** See the published version of the "Fragment of a Satire" (1727) in John Butt, ed.,
The Poems of Alexander Pope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 490.
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Who would not weep, if A

n were he?"*^

The Addison portrait simply reverses the kind of healthily selfdoubting critic who is "Still pleas'd to praise, yet not afraid to
blame." And Addison's psychological narcissism here also make
him look like a Longinian critic who "sits attentive to his own
applause."
Yet Addison's particular way of perverting
regulative ideals into self-inflation is to dissociate" himself from
the affect of his judgments: "Alike reserv'd to blame or to
commend." He is willing to spread shame to the wits and
templars who adoringly extend their "foolish face of praise" up
towards him, yet such shaming is not backed up by a continu
ous oscillation between the two agents, as it is in the Dennis
portrait. Instead Addison seems content to "give his little
Senate laws" as a means of detaching himself from, rather than
as a means of including himself in, the circulation of affect.
•Such a defensive distance seems finally to keep Addison safe
from critical exemplarity, and helps him avoid one risk of
shame: the risk that he may be included in his own judgment.
Pope's emblematic question summing up the portrait ("who
would not weep if A
n were he.^") reinstates emotion as the
meaning of the portrait itself, thus providing a judgment on
Addison that is rationally designed to sustain emotion as part
of the judgment. The impersonal structure of the question
("who would not weep") allows the portrait to function
imperatively, as a moral type 'oi emotional meaning. Yet it is
precisely the typicality, indeed non-referentiality, of the
author's emotional response to Addison that corrects the latter's
dissipation of shame into self-congratulation.
Such selfcongratulation, by removing any other agent from the circuit
of self-reference, negates the direct moral function of literary
emotion that Addison imagines himself singularly able to
impart.
Pope, "Fragment of a Satire" (published 1727); see Epistle to Arhuthnot, 201-14.

